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ABSTRACT
To enable global scale quantum key distribution1–3 (QKD), satellite based systems4,5 are the most promising
approach. So far, free-space QKD has already been demonstrated on communication channels with attenuation
comparable to satellite downlinks,6 and classical laser communications with satellites and aircrafts is heavily
explored.7–10 Here, combining both these challenges, we demonstrate an aircraft to ground QKD transmission
obtaining a sifted key rate of 145 bit/s and a QBER, larglely dominated by background events and stray light,
of 4.8 %.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While in classical communication the bit values “0” and “1” are used to encode the message, in quantum
information qubits are used. They can be formed by in principle every two-level quantum system and additionally
allow for a coherent superposition of the quantum states | 0 〉 and | 1 〉. For communication applications, photons
are most often used to implement the qubits as they can be easily transmitted through the air or via fibers. For
free-space transmissions the polarization degree of freedom is the best choice for encoding quantum information.
Exploiting the extra properties of qubits compared to classical bits, Quantum key distribution (QKD)3 can
offer a level of security11 which can not be reached with any classical methods: The underlying QKD protocols
(here we use BB841) base exclusively on quantum mechanical principles. Moreover, the security proofs12 show
that the QKD transmission noise, i.e. the quantum bit error rate (QBER), is a measure for the amount of
information an eavesdropper may have gained. This allows for the distillation of a shorter, yet secure key from
the transmitted raw data using classical hash functions. This approach is in contrast to classical key distribution
schemes where eavesdropping can not be detected or quantified and where the security is only given by the
computational complexity of the algorithm used and thus may vanish with future technology.
The distance over which QKD was demonstrated could be increased over the last years successively both
in fiber and free-space6,13,14 and also the combination of several links to trusted node quantum networks was
shown.15,16 Noisy quantum channels and detectors, however, impose upper limits on the operating distance of a
QKD system in the range of 150− 200 km.6,13,14 Quantum repeaters17 could extend these distances, however,
they seem to be available rather on a long time scale. For secure key exchange on a global scale QKD transmitters
on (trusted) satellites are promising candidates.
Experiments on the channel characteristics of aircraft and satellite downlinks7,9, 10 have already demonstrated
successful telescope tracking and classical communication with moving airborne/space systems. In addition, long
range free-space QKD and entanglement distribution was shown on a horizontal distance of 144 km between two of
the canary islands6,18–20 coping with attenuation and fluctuations comparable to optical links between satellites
and telescopes on the ground. So far, however, all these experiments are restricted to stationary systems. Our
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Figure 1. Experiment scenario: a The Do228 aircraft equipped with the flight terminal. The inset shows the optical
dome underneath the fuselage housing the coarse pointing assembly (CPA). b, the optical ground station (OGS) of the
German Aerospace Center’s institute of communications and navigation. The normally open framework of the telescope
was covered here to shield against stray light. All optics is mounted to the breadboard attached to the back of the main
mirror.
experiment now for the first time integrates a BB84 system with an airborne platform (fig. 1). Major challenges
arise from the integration into an existing communication terminal, from the need for polarization compensation
of the optical channel and from the high pointing requirements compared to classical optical communication.
2. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In the presented experimental flight campaign the QKD equipment was integrated into the Free-space Exper-
imental Laser Terminal 2 (FELT2) and the optical ground station (OGS) of the German Aerospace Center’s
(DLR) Institute for Communications and Navigation.7,8 This system was originally built to provide fast data
links for large area imaging and to measure channel behaviour of the aircraft-ground and LEO-ground link.7 It
can provide a stable optical channel with the help of bidirectional beacon lasers (1550 nm/1590 nm) in aircraft
to ground scenarios. Additionally, the OGS is also capable of communicating optically with satellites in low
earth orbit and thus can operate with sufficiently high angular velocities.
As a qubit has to be a single quantum entity, in contrast to classical optical communications, it is not possible
to increase the transmitter power in order to adapt to a particular channel attenuation. Rather, efficient coupling
between sender and receiver by small beam divergence and precise pointing has to be ensured. Therefore, both
the FELT2 and the OGS were equipped with additional fine pointing assemblies (FPA) each consisting of a fast
actuated mirror and a position sensitive sensor in a control loop to enable this experiment.
For the quantum key exchange, a transmitter for polarization encoded, attenuated pulse QKD21,22 according
to the BB84 protocol (Alice module, fig. 2) was designed and integrated into the FELT2. With the help of a
photodiode on a servo arm, the Alice module can autonomously calibrate the average QKD pulse intensity to
0.5 photons/pulse to compensate temperature drifts underneath the safety hood covering the terminal during
flight. On the ground, the OGS was supplemented with a QKD receiver (Bob module, fig 3) analyzing the
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Figure 2. Optical path on the transmitter side: In the Alice module22 4 Laserdiodes (LD) generate the BB84 polarization
states (H,V,+,-) according to the BB84 protocol. The light is combined with (polarizing) beam splitters (PBS/BS) and
a half wave plate (HWP) introduces the rotation between the {H,V } and the {+,−} basis. A mode filter (MF) selects a
common mode of all four diodes. The servo arm can place a photo diode (P) for calibration or an attenuator (A) in the
beam. The latter is used for pulse intensities in the single photon regime, here 0.5 photons/pulse. On a dichroic mirror
the outgoing Alice beam (850 nm) is overlapped with the incoming beacon from the OGS (1590 nm). The FELT2 beacon
(1550 nm), also modulated to transmit the data, is sent through a 4 mm hole in the dichroic mirror to minimize stray
light. Note that as Alice is not part of the pointing control loop a precise parallel alignment of the Alice beam and the
tracking axis is crucial. A fast voice coil mirror as part of the FPA ensures fine pointing and directs the beams to the
coarse pointing assembly (CPA) in the dome underneath the aircraft (see fig: 1a).
incoming qubits in accordance with the BB84 protocol. Upstream to this module, a polarization controller was
mounted consisting of three motorized wave plates which allowed to compensate for polarization rotations due
to the constantly changing orientation of the aircraft relative to the OGS and thus the FELT2 pointing mirrors.
Compensation parameters were obtained from prior measurements of the birefringence for all pointing directions
and online pointing information transmitted live from the FELT2 (via uhf-link).
3. FLIGHT CAMPAIGN
The flight campaign took place at the special aircraft Oberpfaffenhofen Germany. The experiment was performed
on half circles with a radius of ≈ 20 km around the OGS located on a rooftop close to the runway. As the
important co-alignment of the QKD beam and the pointing axis could not be stabilized actively, this was
readjusted before every flight on a distance of 300 m.
A fine tuning of this alignment in flight was possible by introducing small offsets in the FELT2 control loop.
Thereby we were able to increase the coupling for the QKD beam (divergence ≈ 180 µrad) without negative
impact on the performance of the pointing system as the terminal beacon had a much wider divergence of 3 mrad.
The new FPA provided a stable optical channel for the whole passage with a mean pointing error of the
FELT2 of less then 150 µrad. This enabled a continuous quantum transmission for 10 min during which we
experienced an overall attenuation of 42.7 dB including also software time filtering of the events with acceptance
windows of 500 ps width. At a repetition frequency of 10 MHz we achieved a sifted key rate of 145 bit/s at a
QBER of 4.8 %. As over 60 % of the errors occurred due to stray light and dark count events (≈ 4000 s−1),
this QBER proves for a precise compensation of the dynamic polarization disturbance inherent to any airborne
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Figure 3. Optical path on the receiver side: The beam coming from the telescope is reflected by a voice coil mirror that is
part of the FPA. A dichroic mirror then separates the QKD signal and the FELT2-beacon. The 1550 nm light is analysed
to do fine tracking of the airplane and to extract the payload data – in this case a 100 Mhz clock signal – from the
FELT-beacon. The 850 nm part of the signal is fed into the polarization controller (λ/4, λ/4, λ/2 waveplates). After
an interference filter (FWHM 10 nm) the signal enters the bob module,21 where a beamsplitter directs the photons to
a polarization analysis in either the {H,V } or the {+,−} bases. HWP: half wave plate, PBS/BS: (polarizing) beam
splitter. All detection events are timestamped and -filtered electronically with respect to the clock signal
scenario. While decoy states have yet to be implemented to make the system robust against attacks on the
poissonian nature of the Alice pulses, thorough analysis predict a secure key rate of 4.8 bit/s once a so-called
vacuum+weak23 decoy protocol is implemented.
4. RESULTS
In this experiment we successfully integrated QKD technology with an existing system for classical free-space
laser communication. Thereby we prove QKD to be a suitable add-on for a variety of communication systems
working on a direct line of sight. The fine pointing assemblies developed in this work enabled a stable link
for the complete passage of the airplane. Moreover, the constantly changing birefringence introduced by the
various moving mirrors and the optical coatings could be compensated precisely. By successfully addressing
these challenges, we were able to demonstrate the first BB84 key exchange with an airborne transmitter at high
angular velocity. This experiment can thus be regarded as a huge step towards QKD with and between airplanes
and satellites enabling world wide, secure key exchange in a trusted node topology.
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